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Biden Administration Declares Pro-LGBTQ+ Policies

who are the proper defendants when the
suit is based on the absence of policy?
The Butterfield appeal followed the
dismissal of the second of two pro se
complaints Butterfield filed a year apart.
In the interim between Butterfield’s
cases, South Dakota hired a consultant
to help it “draft” transgender policy:
Cynthia Osborne (who should be
familiar to the transgender prisoner
bar). After Butterfield’s first case was
dismissed, Osborne went to South
Dakota at the state’s request. She met
with officials and interviewed several
inmates, including Butterfield.
Osborne issued a Report on
Butterfield, finding “severe” gender
dysphoria and recommending hormone
therapy. South Dakota concealed the
Osborne report and its recommendations
from Butterfield, as it continued to deny
her grievances requesting hormones.
This writer did not learn of the Osborne
report until after briefing, when its
findings almost jumped off the page.
The Court of Appeals granted
a motion to enlarge the Butterfield
record to include the Osborne report.
Although it was discussed at length at
oral argument, there is no reference
to it in the appellate decision. During
this appeal, two other things happened:
Butterfield was released, and South
Dakota adopted a transgender policy.
Butterfield has a monetary claim for
damages that survives, because the
dismissal that was affirmed is without
prejudice. The § 1983 limitations
period in South Dakota is three years,
and Butterfield was never given benefit
of treatment under the new “policy.”
She is free to sue based on denial of
treatment and the state’s deception
with the Osborne report. Exhaustion of
administrative remedies and other rules
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
do not apply to a new case filed after a
prisoner is released, even if the events
underlying the case arose in prison. Doe
v. Washington County, 150 F.3d 920,
924 (8th Cir. 1998). ■
William Rold is a civil rights attorney
in NYC and a former judge. He
previously represented the American Bar
Association on the National Commission
for Correctional Health Care.
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Colorado Supreme Court Revises
Common Law Marriage Rules to Reflect
Social Change and Same-Sex Marriages
By Arthur S. Leonard
In a trio of decisions issued on
January 11, the Colorado Supreme Court
revised the state’s common law marriage
rules to reflect the many changes that
have occurred since it last dealt with
this topic comprehensively in 1987 in
People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660 (Colo.
1987). In Hogsett v. Neale, 2021 WL
79536, and LaFleur v. Pyfer, 2021 WL
79532, the court dealt with same-sex
couples in divorce proceedings, while
in the third case, In re Estate of Yudkin,
2021 WL 79542, the court dealt with
a dispute between an intestate man’s
ex-wife and his alleged common law
wife as to whom should be appointed
administrator of the estate. Justice
Monica Marquez wrote the opinions
for the court. There were concurring
and dissenting opinions in the cases of
the same-sex couples, and concurrences
in Yudkin. This report will focus on
Hogsett v. Neale and LaFleur v. Pyfer,
the cases involving same-sex couples. In
Yudkin, the court remanded so the trial
court could apply the newly-announced
analysis to determine whether the exwife or the alleged common law wife
your be appointed administrator.
Justice Marquez referred to Hogsett
as the “lead opinion” of the three,
since it focused on an issue common
to all three: what factors should a
court consider in determining whether
there was a common law marriage?
LaFleur focuses on an issue not
contested in Hogsett: whether the
Obergefell marriage equality decision
can be applied “retroactively” to find
a common law marriage was formed
many years before Obergefell was
decided?
Edi L. Hogsett and Marcia E.
Neale were in a long-term relationship
beginning in November 2001 and never
formally married. Same-sex marriages
became available in Colorado through
judicial ruling in October 2014. The
women jointly filed a pro se petition for

dissolution of a claimed common law
marriage in January 2015. “The parties
mediated a separation agreement
stating that they had entered a common
law marriage on December 1, 2002, and
that their marriage was irretrievably
broken,” wrote Justice Marquez. At
a status conference, the trial judge
explained that the court would have
to determine that a marriage existed
before it could address the petition for
dissolution, but the parties decided that
rather than go through that process, they
would stipulate to dismissal as they had
“fully settled all issues” through the
mediation process.
But later Hogsett “sought certain
retirement assets and maintenance she
believed Neale owed her under their
separation agreement,” to which Neale
responded that “no marriage existed
between them.” Hogsett then filed a
new petition for dissolution and Neale
moved to dismiss, claiming the parties
had no common law marriage. The trial
judge agreed with Neale. Although
finding that it could recognize a
common law same-sex marriage
predating Obergefell v. Hodges, 576
U.S. 644 (2015), the court found that
the Lucero factors and the trial record
would not support a conclusion that
there was a mutual agreement to marry,
and the court of appeals affirmed,
finding that although Hogsett may
have thought she was married and the
women had cohabitated, Neale had
never acknowledge agreeing to marry
Hogsett, even though there was an
informal exchange of rings at a gay bar,
although not any ceremony with invited
guests at that time. The court of appeals
did not reject the trial court’s holding
that it was possible to contract a samesex common law marriage prior to
Obergefell but accepted the trial judge’s
finding that the mutuality required to
find such a legal relationship was lacking
on this record. One of the appeals

judges argued, however, that common
law marriage was an anachronism
and that the Colorado Supreme Court
should abolish the doctrine in that state.
(Justice Marquez notes in her opinions
that Colorado is one of only nine states
[plus the District of Columbia] that still
recognize the formation of common
law marriages, the others being Iowa,
Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah and
Texas.)
By contrast, Dean LaFleur and
Timothy Pfyer did have a formal
ceremony in 2003, with vows before
a clergyman, exchange of rings in the
presence of family and friends, and a
claim by Pyfer that he had proposed
marriage to LaFleur and that LeFleur
had accepted the proposal. The
ceremony in Colorado was held shortly
after the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court’s decision in Goodridge
v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440 Mass.
309, 798 N.E.2d 941(2003), which
recognized a right for same-sex couples
to marry under that state’s constitution,
the first such decision in the United
States. Justice Marquez found this
significant, since it suggested that a
same-sex couple in 2003 could believe
that a same-sex marriage was a legal
possibility. As with Hogsett and Neale,
LaFleur and Pyfer did not enter a formal
legal marriage in Colorado when that
became possible in 2014, and as their
relationship had cooled off and Pyfer had
a new boyfriend, he filed a dissolution
petition in January 2018, claiming they
had a common law marriage dating
from the 2003 ceremony. Pyfer sought
a property division and maintenance
award from the court, which was
probably a substantial motivation to file
the lawsuit.
LaFleur denied the possibility that
the ceremony they held in 2003 could
have created a common law marriage,
since “same sex marriages were not
recognized or protected under Colorado
law” then. The trial judge ruled for Pyfer,
finding that Obergefell recognized
an existing constitutional right, that
the men had manifested mutual intent
to marry in 2003, and that Pyfer was
entitled to seek a dissolution. However,
Pyfer was disappointed in how the trial

court distributed assets and appealed,
as LaFleur cross-appealed, insisting
that there had been no common law
marriage. The Colorado Supreme
Court had already granted petitions
for certiorari in Hogsett and Yudkin,
so LaFleur petitioned the court to take
this case directly, bypassing the court of
appeals.
In LaFleur, the Supreme Court
agreed with the trial judge, rejecting
LaFleur’s argument that it was
impossible for a common law marriage
to be formed by a same-sex couple
prior to October 2014. As the issue of
Obergefell’s “retroactivity” was not
contested by the parties in Hogsett,
the Supreme Court’s decision in that
case focused on modifying the Lucero
factors to reflect modern reality. Lucero
was a criminal prosecution in which the
issue of spousal testimonial privilege
turned on whether the court found a
common law marriage to exist. “In
Lucero,” wrote Justice Marquez, “we
held that a couple could establish a
common law marriage ‘by the mutual
consent or agreement of the parties to be
husband and wife, followed by a mutual
and open assumption of a marital
relationship.’ We directed that evidence
of such agreement and conduct could
be found in a couple’s cohabitation;
reputation in the community as
husband and wife; maintenance of joint
banking and credit accounts; purchase
and joint ownership of property; filing
of joint tax returns; and use of the man’s
surname by the woman or by children
born to the parties.” The trial courts had
expressed frustration that this list of
evidentiary factors did not fit very well
in an analysis of a same-sex couple, and
the Hogsett court pointedly asked for
the Supreme Court to revisit the issue in
light of changes since 1987, including,
of course, Obergefell.
Justice Marquez acknowledged the
need for a more expansive approach. She
wrote that “the gender-differentiated
terms and heteronormative assumptions
of the Lucero test render it ill-suited for
same-sex couples. More broadly, many
of the traditional indicia of marriage
identified in Lucero are no longer
exclusive to marital relationships.
At the same time, genuine marital

relationships no longer necessarily bear
Lucero’s traditional markers. The lower
court decisions in these cases reflect the
challenges of applying Lucero to these
changed circumstances.”
“In this case,” Marquez continued,
“we refine the test from Lucero and
hold that a common law marriage may
be established by the mutual consent
or agreement of the couple to enter the
legal and social institution of marriage,
followed by conduct manifesting that
mutual agreement. The core query is
whether the parties intended to enter a
marital relationship — that is, to share a
life together as spouses in a committed,
intimate relationship of mutual support
and obligation. In assessing whether
a common law marriage has been
established, courts should accord weight
to evidence reflecting a couple’s express
agreement to marry. In the absence of
such evidence, the parties’ agreement
to enter a marital relationship may be
inferred from their conduct. When
examining the parties’ conduct, the
factors identified in Lucero can still be
relevant to the inquiry, but they must be
assessed in context; the inferences to be
drawn from the parties’ conduct may
vary depending on the circumstances.
Finally, the manifestation of the parties’
agreement to marry need not take a
particular form.”
However,
under
this
new
formulation, the court agreed with the
trial judge that Hogsett had failed to
prove a common-law marriage, mainly
because Neale’s credible testimony
undercut the contention that there was a
mutual agreement to marry (or to enter
a spousal-type relationship as described
by the court), and the ring exchange
in the gay bar, when set against all
the credible testimony, did not convey
the same import of mutual agreement
as the formal wedding ceremony of
Pyfer and LaFleur. On the other hand,
having set out this new formulation
of the potentially relevant evidentiary
factors, the court concluded that Pyfer
had succeeded in proving a common
law marriage with LaFleur. The court
agreed with Pyfer, as well, that the
trial judge had erred in dividing the
assets upon dissolution, failing to
make findings of fact that are normally
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required and giving weight to factors
that should not be relevant, so the case
was remanded for reconsideration of
the asset distribution.
The court was by no means
unanimous in all the holdings in the
same-sex couple cases. Justice Carlos
S. Samour entered a vigorous dissent in
LaFleur, agreeing with Dean LeFleur
that Obergefell could not be applied
retroactively in this way. “Is it possible
for a same-sex couple in Colorado to have
mutually intended and agreed to enter
into a legal marital relationship when
both parties were aware that Colorado
law prohibited same-sex marriage
at the time? The answer is clearly
no,” he asserted. “When Pyfer and
LaFleur participated in their wedding
ceremony in November 2003, they
both understood that same-sex couples
could not lawfully marry in Colorado
because Colorado considered same-sex
marriages unlawful, unenforceable, and
invalid. Thus, Pyfer and LaFleur could
not possible have intended or agreed
to enter into the legal relationship of
marriage. And because common law
marriage in Colorado requires mutual
intent and agreement to enter into the
legal relationship of marriage, Pyfer
and LaFleur cannot be deemed to have
entered into a common law marriage.”
In Hogsett, Justice Samour concurred
in the judgment only, finding that the
women did not have a common law
marriage.
Justice Melissa Hart, concurring
in Hogsett, wrote that she was joining
the majority opinions in the three cases
“because the opinions offer helpful
refinement of the common law marriage
test to be applied to those common
law marriages that have already been
entered.” But she offered a separate
opinion to state her agreement with
the judge in the court of appeals who
thought that “Colorado should join the
overwhelming majority of states” and
abolish common law marriage going
forward. “The historic conditions that
once justified the need for the doctrine
are no longer present,” she wrote, “its
application is often unpredictable
and inconsistent, and it ties parties
and courts up in needlessly costly
litigation.”
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Chief Justice Brian Boatright also
wrote separately, concurring in the
judgments in both same-sex marriage
cases, but expressing reservations
about the majority’s approach. As far
as he was concerned, the key finding
in a common law marriage case had to
be mutual intent and agreement to enter
a marriage, which he found lacking in
Hogsett and present in LaFleur. But,
he insisted, the revision of the Lucero
factors offered by the majority was
unnecessary to decide these two cases
and potentially problematic. “Today,”
he wrote in Hogsett, “the majority
announces new factors for establishing
common law marriage even though
those factors are ultimately irrelevant
under the circumstances of this case.”
Since the testimony at trial indicated
lack of mutual intent to marry, he felt the
court should have stopped right there
and affirmed the trial court’s decision
that the women did not have a common
law marriage. “Thus, in my view,” he
continued, “the majority decides more
than is necessary because the record
clearly evinces – without considering
any factors – that no common law
marriage existed. And in deciding what
it need not, the majority also potentially
broadens the definition of marriage in a
way that I fear will only further confuse
the already complex concept of common
law marriage. Because I agree with the
majority’s ultimate conclusion that Neale
and Hogsett did not enter into a common
law marriage, I respectfully concur in
the judgment only.” And, in LaFleur, his
concurrence insisted that “application
of any factors is unnecessary because,
in my view, the fact that Dean LaFleur
and Timothy Pyfer had a ceremony that
was – in every way – a wedding evinces
their mutual intent to be married. In the
simplest of terms, LaFleur and Pyfer are
married because they had a wedding.
I do agree with the majority, however,
that the fundamental right to marry as
outlined in Obergefell . . . ‘must be given
retroactive effect.’” Thus, he agreed that
LaFleur should be remanded only on
the question of property division and
spousal maintenance.
It will be interesting to see whether
the Colorado legislature decides to enter
the debate in this case by legislating

to end common law marriage or,
alternatively, codifying it in law with
prescribed evidentiary requirements
reflecting modern realities of family
life. Chief Justice Boatright’s concern
about the revised factors making the
process of judicial determination of
a common law marriage even more
complicated than it had previously been
under Lucero may well strike a chord.
But any repeal of common law marriage
would of necessity be prospective only,
so same-sex couples who had attempted
to formalize their relationships prior
to Obergefell should still be able to
present claims to the courts. As an
example of this phenomenon, although
Pennsylvania abolished common law
marriage early in this century, their
courts have evaluated claims concerning
common law marriages of same-sex
couples formed prior to the repeal.
To do otherwise would raise serious
due process concerns, since it would
be difficult to argue that a state could
legislatively repeal existing common
law marriages when the right to marry
has been deemed “fundamental” by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell.
Edi Hogsett is represented by
Griffiths Law PC, Ann Gushurst,
Littleton, CO; Radman Law Firm,
LLC, Diane R. Radman, Denver, CO;
and Aitken Law Firm, LLC, Sharlene
J. Aitken, Denver, CO. Marcia Neale
is represented by Plog & Stein, P.C.,
Jessica A. Saldin and Stephen J.
Plog, Greenwood Village, CO. Dean
LaFleur is represented by Antolinez
Miller, LLC, Joseph H. Antolinez and
Melissa Miller, Centennial, CO; and
Azizour Donnelly, LLC, Katayoum A.
Donnelly, Denver, CO. Timothy Pyfer
is represented by Law Offices of Rodger
C. Daley, Rodger C. Daley, Carrie
Vonachen, and Dorian Geisler, Denver,
CO; and Reilly LLP, John M. McHugh,
Denver, CO. Amicus briefs were filed
in both of these cases, including briefs
from the Family Law Section of the
Colorado State Bar and from LGBT
rights groups: The Colorado LGBT Bar
Association, the Colorado Women’s
Bar Association, Lambda Legal, and
the National Center for Lesbian Rights,
with numerous cooperating attorneys
listed on the briefs. ■

